REQUEST FOR INSPECTION NTPC POWER GENERATION PROJECT Cr. 3632
Part Two

27. The Bank did not ensure that the various alternatives were considered carefully so as to avoid involuntary resettlement. The alternatives in the Singrauli region would have also meant managing with the existing ash dikes and upgrading them, or backfilling the excavated coal mine. Infact backfilling of mines was included as a possibility in the Environmental Assessment Summary for the project. This negligence on the part of the Bank has caused the people avoidable hardship and is pushing them to further vulnerability. In the case of PAPs of Rihand II, the borrower had initially planned to site the ash dike in two nearby villages namely Jheelo and Parwatwa village but later changed the decision and relocated the ash dike at the present site.

28. In a paper prepared by the Borrower for the WB Task Manager, NTPC argues that a decision to change location of "permanent ash dike" from Jhilo-Parwatwa village to Mitihini- Khairi was based on the concern to reduce social impact (Letter No 01/CP/4.01 Feb, 23, 1995 from S.L. Kapoor Addl. GM NTPC to Task Manager, WB). Our contention is that this decision was guided by purely commercial considerations. The proof of this is that the Borrower has not surrendered any of the private land/cultivated land in Jhilo-Parwatwa. Nearly 500 families will be directly affected in those villages. While payment of compensation in Jheelo-Parvatwa villages has yet not been completed, there are allegations of outsiders having forged land records on a large scale depriving the real owners including some of the most vulnerable tribal groups like Gond, Baigas and Harijans. This allegation also finds a mention in the report of a socio-economic survey (Tata Institute of Social Sciences - Socio-economic Survey of Oustees of Rihand Stage I, March 95) carried out in compliance with the provisions of the 1993 R&R policy. The situation in Jhilo- Parwatwa villages is at present marked by confusion and uncertainty.

29. Here, it would be pertinent to also state that the Environmental Assessment Summary for the 1993 project admits that for the expansion of Rihand and Vindhyachal thermal power plants no alternatives sites(s) for the plant and township has been considered because sufficient land has already been acquired . In his letter to the Berne Declaration dated April 5, 1995 India Country Director Heinz Vergin further argued that the suitability of the locations (for the expansions of the power stations) was already established . In this context, it is significant to point out the criteria that were used for selection of sites for power plants. The Executive Summary of the 1991 EdF report lists six specific criteria which range from proximity to the lake for cooling requirements to accessibility to roads (p.32). Although relatively large population displacements was acknowledged as a problem, the inhabitation and agricultural use of the sites by large groups of people was not a criterion for selection of sites. We have no indication that the Bank ever tried to alter the criteria which is a clear violation of OD 4.30 (para 3a).

X. Development Perspective

30. According to OD 4.30, para 3(b), all involuntary resettlement should be conceived and executed as development programmes, with resettlers provided sufficient investment resources and opportunities to share in project benefits . In Singrauli region, the only possibilities for the majority of oustees to share in project benefits are land or secure jobs. The 1993 NTPC project offers neither. The Rehabilitation Action Plan in practice focuses on self-employment schemes, training to upgrade skills, and the award of petty contracts. In practice these schemes are handled in a very arbitrary manner by NTPC and, as far as numbers are concerned, do not measure up to the promises made by NTPC and the World Bank. There is only an extremely limited market for self-employment (such as carpet-weaving) and petty contracts in the Singrauli region in the first place. NTPC jobs (a second option) are mostly handed out on a contractual basis, which is highly exploitative. This practice is reinforced by World Bank rules which measure the efficiency of power utilities by an output-workforce ratio. The potential for sharing in project benefits through land-for-land options (the third option) is elaborated later in the claim.

XI. Negative Impact even before Acquisition

31. Even before the land in Mitihini and Khairi villages was acquired the people had started being affected by the impact of acquisition in surrounding villages of Bijpur, Dodhar, Sirsoti and Adhaura for construction of 2 500 MW Rihand I. The construction of Rihand I began in 1983 and the influx of thousands of labourers put pressure on nearby forest which used to be the source of fuel wood, fodder and medicinal herbs. The commissioning of the Rihand I in 1989 also reduced the area that used to be released from submergence. This meant reduction of area available for cultivation, a decline in the quantum of fodder for cattle. The health of the cattle started deteriorating and the milk yield declined very sharply. Milk and milk products used to be a regular part of the people's diet and income. The ash from the temporary ash dikes in Bijpur also affected adversely the yields of some of the major crops. So even before actual acquisition of their own lands the earning capacity, production and health of the villagers was affected because of acquisition in surrounding areas. The PAPs of Singrauli projects feel strongly that since power plants are responsible for their deteriorated health, the least that the NTPC could have done was to provide them with free access to its hospitals.

XII. Compensation not at Replacement Value of Assets

32. According to OD 4.30 para 8 valuation of lost assets should be made at their replacement cost. The rate at which people were compensated did not take into account the various losses elaborated in the above paragraph. The rate did not take into consideration the cost which PAPs incurred in developing the poor quality land into fertile fields. The rate did not include the cost involved in raising and nurturing trees and the real income from fruit bearing trees like mango, guava and so on. Nor did it take into account the loss of area available for cultivation in the land periodically out of submergence. The compensation or the rehabilitation package does not reflect cognizance of loss of grazing grounds, disappearing forests, loss of water available from the Rihand dam and many other direct and indirect losses that would be suffered by the people because of displacement.

33. The resettlement and rehabilitation package was prepared without consulting the PAPs. The only consideration that went into it was the least cost to be borne by the borrower. The Bank failed to incorporate resettlement planning in design and financing of the project. This is a violation of OD 4.30 according to which "planning and financing resettlement components or free standing projects are an integral part of preparation of projects that cause involuntary resettlement."

34. The budget for the NTPC Power Generation Project did not reflect the cost of rehabilitation. Nor did the project schedule reflect the timing of rehabilitation. The Resettlement Action Plan approved by the Bank as part of the project was based on a R&R policy that was prepared without consulting the PAPs. In fact the policy was approved despite strong criticism against it within the World Bank. Nor did the policy take into account the real impact of the project. It did not take into consideration the fact that even this most inadequate compensation was staggered over several years. People had to pay 5-10% as bribe to functionaries of Revenue Department of State Government just to be able to get their compensation. The R&R policy and package did not take into account that people were compelled to spend a substantial amount of compensation on litigation. The acquisition of land led to emergence of many land disputes inspite of a major land records operation. People who had left the village in 1960 returned to reap the benefit of compensation by staking claim on some of the land. The callousness of the state authorities and the borrower dragged the people into a series of court cases that are still undecided. With construction going on unhampered all ground level proofs of occupation will disappear making it difficult for PAPs to get justice. The NTPC by acquiring their land and not ensuring proper rehabilitation further compelled the people to spend their meagre resources on seeking justice from courts. Litigation in India is not only expensive but often takes a long time to get decided.

35. Worst of all, the borrower argued that the Resettlement Action Plans have not seen the light of the day and hence there is not question to enforce the same . The arrogance of the borrower and its attitude towards the PAPs is best reflected in the statement filed in Augusut 1995 by NTPC at the High Court of Allahabda, according to which the implementation of RAP as a condition of 1993 Bank loan was entirely an internal matter between the NTPC and the World Bank the PAPs or their representatives have no locus standi in the matter.

XIII. Consultation

36. The Bank guidelines require participation of the affected persons and their representatives in every stage of project preparation and implementation. But there exists no genuine mechanism for meaningful consultation to take place. Even the Village Development Advisory Committee (VDAC) is an undemocratically constituted mechanism completely in the hands of NTPC. Inspite of the acknowledgement by the Bank of the ineffective structures for participation very little was done by the Bank to press for change. The routine interactions between the PAPs and the staff of NTPC, where the latter would insist that the people must vacate the lands were projected by the borrower as examples of participation and consultation. Even the unannounced visits of the WB missions were cited as illustrations of consultation meetings. One such visit took place in July 1992 when some WB officials, the representatives of borrower and district officials enquired about the choice of PAPs for rehabilitation. This visit (about which there was no prior information to PAPs) was projected as a consultative meeting in the Staff Appraisal Report annexures. It is during this visit that an attempt was made by the borrower and the Bank to influence the PAPs to opt for income generation programmes instead of land or job whereas the PAPs had given a clear preference to jobs and agricultural land. Such interactions can hardly be termed as consultation meetings. The atmosphere at the other so-called consultations has been authoritative with senior police officials present at some of these meetings. It is at such meetings that PAPs were sometimes openly warned of harassment if they did not vacate the village. The attitude of the officials completely lacked sympathy for the PAPs.

37. Daily contacts between NTPC and PAPs whether in the community or at the public information centres are marked by extreme distrust, mutual hostility and tension. The staff at the R&R cells harbour a condescending and scornful attitude towards the PAPs. Systematic attempts are made to keep the trusted representatives of PAPs out of the consultative meetings. The WB OD 4.01 listing the Bank's expectations on consultations requires that the borrower takes the views of affected groups, local NGOs fully into account in project design and implementation and in particular in the preparation of environmental assessment. In the case of Singrauli projects the structures for consultation, participation have been set up for satisfaction of the Bank and can at best be termed mere formality. The Public Information Centres (PICs), the VDACs etc. can in no case be accepted as structures that can help in drawing genuine inputs from affected persons and their representatives including NGOs. There was no participation of the people and their representatives in the preparation of the EA.

XIV. Land Based Compensation

38. In the R&R policy of 1993 land option had been restricted without any justification to Stage II which has been defined technically in such a way that smallest possible number of PAPs fell within its ambit. ( Although the socioeconomic survey concluded that sixty-three percent of the affected persons in Rihand II opted for land as the most preferred form of rehabilitation. Further the land option even for Stage II PAPs was made virtually impractical by placing several preconditions like PAPs should return compensation money before land could be provided; the option offered did not even comply with the WB directive (4.30 para 13) that land atleast equivalent to that lost should be provided. A study conducted in 1993 by GHK/MRM International prepared a draft plan for the displaced people of Singrauli region. This draft also discusses the restrictive nature of the land option offered as part of the 1993 R&R policy of NTPC as well as the inadequacy of RAPs for Rihand & Vindhyanchal Stage -II (Ref. Displaced Peoples Action Plan : Development and Environmental Management Strategy in Singrauli region, GHK/MRM International 1994, p.19). The policy restricted the extent of land to a maximum of 5 acres. All these were for the borrower and WB cost cutting measures that guided the formulation of R&R policy. Such a policy naturally would have been resisted and PAPs of Vindhyachal and Rihand did not accept the provisions. Even these limited provisions were arbitrarily withdrawn. The resistance of PAPs to the specific parts of the land option were conveniently construed to conclude that PAPs were not interested in land-for-land (see minutes of so-called Land Purchase Committees meeting). In case of PAPs of Rihand II contradictory explanations were given for the inability of the borrower to arrange land. It was stated in the NTPC paper dated 23.2.95 addressed to Task Manager (para 8.3) that PAPs were reluctant to nominate any representative on Land Purchase Committee. However, a circular received on 20.9.94 from NTPC corporate office indicates the composition of LPC which shows three nominees of PAPs of Mitihini. Their disagreement with the package was construed as meaning that PAPs did not want land! Nor were PAPs affected by Vindhyachal extensions provided with land.

39. Interestingly, the 1993 policy was hailed by the Bank as landmark development for inclusion of land for land as an option, but during the July 1992 visit of WB officials PAPs had already been told that land would not be possible to provide! While land was included theoretically in the policy, the option was never given effect in reality.

40. According to OD 4.30, para 11 socio-economic surveys..... should be conducted as early as possible to prevent inflows of population in eneligible for compensation . But the socio economic surveys of PAPs affected by the expansion of power stations were carried out long after the process of land acquisition and compensation had already started. The land was acquired between 1986-1989 whereas the survey was conducted in 1992 for PAPs of Rihand and Vindhyachal extensions. In case of Rihand II the survey conducted in 1992 by an agency called MODE was followed by an in-house survey copies of which were never made available. Nor did these socio economic surveys carried out in compliance with the new R&R policy include any analysis of the adequacy or inadequacy of compensations already paid to the people in helping improvement or atleast restoration of their living standards. The socio economic surveys did not include an assessment of the scale and impact of resettlement on displaced people. Information in the surveys did not include incomes derived from common property resources, forests and so on. The Bank failed to ensure that the rehabilitation action plans developed within the framework of the policy were based on rigorous feasibility studies of various rehabilitation options. In fact, an internal memorandum of the Bank castigated the R&R policy by maintaining that the "policy is weak on what will be done to ensure that PAPs restore or improve income levels, and is particularly weak on the issue of providing land for land to those who want it." And yet the Bank failed to ensure that the final version of the policy actually came up to the Bank standards. It is understood that concerns had also been raised within the Bank on the absence of any resettlement plans for the two coal mines that would feed the expansion of Rihand and Vindhyachal power plants. The debate within the Bank warned "the first project the Bank financed in Singrauli area caused so much aggravation and pain, that we should (not) fall into the same trap again."

XV. Access to Information

41. The Bank failed to ensure the existence of a genuine mechanism for ensuring that the PAPs have timely access to relevant information. The Public Information Centre (PIC) which were set up in 1994 as a result of pressure from NGOs are again an eye wash. The complaints filed by PAPs remain unattended or not attended to their satisfaction. Most documents of any relevance to PAPs are in English - a language they cannot comprehend. Even for activists, like us who can comprehend find it hard to obtain documents. One out of several requests for information may get attended. A report in the PIC at Rihand was not made available to the visiting team of NGOs from Switzerland and USA in November 96 despite the promise made by a responsible officer of the R&R department. The response at the end of their visit was that the Corporate office has advised against making the said report available. The document were finally made available to Berne Declaration after 3 months! The Indian counterparts are not even as privileged. A series of progress reports sent by the borrower to the WB were to be sent to the local activist according to a letter dated January 2, 1997 of David Marsden, Chief of the Social Development Unit of New Delhi World Bank Office. These documents had not been provided till the filing of this claim. The PAPs also do not have any idea about the role of the Bank in the project nor about the policy guidelines relating to WB investments.

XVI. Role of Sociologists

42. The Bank had been reporting since 1995 satisfaction with progress of R&R efforts of the borrower and appointment of sociologists at the power stations was repeatedly cited as an evidence of borrowers commitment. (Eg. letter dated July 12, 1995 from Task Manager to Dr. Peter Bosshard of Berne Declaration). But the appointment of sociologists since June 1995 made matters even worse for the PAPs. The sociologists were merely an addition to the battery of officials who could harass and pressurise the people to move out. "This is all that the company will give, it is better to leave or else you would have to be forced to leave". The sociologists efforts were also to prevent PAPs from complaining or testifying before independent investigating teams. There is not a bit of difference in the attitude and behaviour of NTPC officials from civil works department and those from rehabilitation department. All of them including the sociologists have one and only one concern - how to get the work site cleared of 'obstruction'. PAPs are seen as nothing more than obstruction in the way of project work. The sociologists are known to be rude to PAPs who visit the PIC to seek opportunities for even temporary work. A woman from Rihand I was rudely turned away by the sociologist who advised her not to visit the PIC and that she would be informed if and when there is work. The Bank saw improved R&R only as technical issue requiring recruitment of trained persons. Whereas what was critically missing was political will. The people's feedback on the role of sociologists had no effect on WB officials attitude. The response of WB Resident Mission was diplomatic, exasperating and frustrating to say the least.

XVII. Repression Associated with Resettlement

43. The WB guidelines censure use of force, intimidation, repression as means to resettle PAPs. Yet, repression has been a regular feature in all the projects of NTPC in Singrauli. The PAPs have been manipulated by the borrower, their identity as a community has been negated, their organisations were sidelined. Eg. the borrower systematically avoided reference to the villagers organisation namely The Grameen Kalyan Sangharsh Samiti (GKSS). The borrower took every opportunity to sharpen feelings of rivalry and competition among communities of people who were in fact all similarly affected by the project. The use of 'divide and rule' tactics and manipulations were repeatedly brought to the attention of the Bank but the latter ignored these grievances of PAPs or dismissed them as unsubstantiated. If anything, the versions of the pliable amongst the PAPs and those of the borrower were accepted by the Bank as the last word. The Bank's attitude was extremely casual towards complaints of harassment by the police and administration which were in fact engineered by the borrower. The Bank chose to ignore the complaints that PAPs were beaten, sent to jail, the women folk were manhandled and taken into police custody, men and women were implicated in false criminal cases, their crops ere wantonly destroyed. That the borrower resorted to demeaning ways such as letting the ash slurry on to the villagers fields with a view to destroy their economic base and secure their consent to move were not startling enough for the Bank. The Bank did not pay any heed to reports that the borrower had even resorted to use of muscle power in a bid to drive out the PAPs. The repression included surveillance of the movements of the activists by the intelligence agency of the borrower, the administration and the Central Industrial Security Force. A man was even deputed from the intelligence department of NTPC as an escort with an investigating team of National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in October 1996. Even a PAP was prevented by the borrower from appearing as witness before the NHRC investigating team and there were others who were threatened with reprisals for having deposed before the investigating team.

44. Abuse of the media to discredit the genuine cause of the PAPs and the activists supporting their struggle was also brought to the attention of the World Bank to no avail. Such indifference from the Bank is not surprising when even reports of threat to life did not move the Bank officials. The continuous indifference of the Bank, however, encouraged the borrower to become even more repressive. An activist of GKSS had a narrow escape when he was run over by a dumper truck in September 1996 at the instigation of an engineer of NTPC. Even the telephone lines were disrupted or interfered with by the borrower in times of grave tension with the PAPs. The Bank responded coldly to the issue of repression - the standard response was "we have asked NTPC to give their comments on allegations."

45. The nexus operating between the borrower, the state machinery, the contractors and many outsiders has been very strong. This nexus broke the resistance of the PAPs. Inducements of small money, unofficially giving extra benefits/facilities to some to the exclusion of others; rewarding the villagers who first of all disrupted the unity of the villagers and sided with the borrower, the contractor, and the police; implicating the others in false cases; destroying the fields with standing crops thereby eroding the economic base of those who continued to resist, putting the resisting villagers in jail so demeaning have been the ways of securing the PAPs "will" to shift.

XVIII Indigenous Peoples

46. The Bank guidelines on involuntary resettlement and indigenous people provide for extra caution to be exercised in projects while dealing with indigenous groups. None of the World Bank financed projects in Singrauli gave any special consideration to tribal and ethnic groups. The OD 4.30 require that land, housing, infrastructure and other compensation should be provided to the adversely affected population, indigenous groups, ethnic minorities and pastoralists who may have usufruct or customary rights to the land or other resources taken for the project. The directives clearly state that absence of legal title to land by such groups should not be a bar to compensation. These groups were amongst those hit hardest by the projects. The customary rights of these communities over the lands they cultivated for ages were not recognised and they were therefore not compensated for the same. Some of the most vulnerable groups such as the dharkars, gond, baigas have been driven to a life of utter misery in terms of complete erosion of their livelihood and cultural identities. Their traditional occupations and way of life were rendered irrelevant because of disappearance of forests.The dharkars who engaged in bamboo work as a traditional occupation are finding it hard to practice it because of lack of access to the remaining bamboo groves in the region.

XIX. Impact on Women

47. Often women's weak position in the social structure made hem bear the worst consequences of land acquisition. From being active producers and workers well integrated into the agricultural economy they suddenly moved to being either out of work or casual labourers in the market economy. There have been several instances where the men deserted their women after taking compensation leaving them to fend for themselves. The other impacts for women include greater burden of adjustments after displacements. Women also faced repression while resisting forcible dispossession and were sent to the police station, ill-treated during the detention and charged with criminal offences.

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